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ABSTRACT
Managing large sets of access-control rules is a complex task
for security administrators. Each addition, deletion or mod-
ification of a rule causes many potential and unknown side
effects ranging from rule conflicts to security breaches. Secu-
rity researchers have attempted to alleviate this problem by
proposing algorithms and tools which analyze lists of rules
and provide administrators with the information that they
need to better manage their rules. Unfortunately few of
these analysis tools connect a policy problem to the source
of the problem clearly. In this work we discuss an interface
that visualizes the output of policy analysis and the source
of the output in terms of rule lists and shows administrators
the effect of their changes.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection—
Access Controls; H.1.2 [Models and Principles]: User
/ Machine systems—Human Factors; H.5.2 [Information
Interfaces and Presentation]: User Interfaces
General Terms
Human Factors, Management, Security, Standardization
Keywords
Access control, Usability, Visualization, Policy Analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
The task of access-control policy management has become
an increasingly hard problem for both security profession-
als and organizations in general. As issues such as secu-
rity breaches become more public, organizations are becom-
ing increasingly interested in effectively controlling access to
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their resources. In Deloitte and Touche’s 2007 survey of 169
financial institutions they found that 98% of respondents
were spending more money on information security than in
the previous year [12].
Even with the increase in attention to information secu-
rity, administrators still deal with many challenges including
managing extremely large policy files for a range of different
systems. Firewall rule sets, for example, can range in size
from only a few rules to thousands [21]. Managing policies
that are so large can require a higher cognitive load than
the administrator can reasonably manage [5]. As a result
administrators find ways of managing the load such as keep-
ing technical notes about their own systems [7].
In this paper we define an access-control policy to be a
collection of rules. The term rule is used as a general term
to describe a tuple containing entities which can be evalu-
ated to produce either an allow or deny decision. A firewall
rule for example might contain the tuple (protocol, sourceIP,
source port, destinationIP, destination port, action) while a
Privacy-aware Role Based Access Control (P-RBAC) rule is
actually a permission assignment of a form (role, resource,
action, condition).
In addition to being large, policies can also be compli-
cated. Understanding complex policies requires an in-depth
knowledge of the policy language, policy semantics and the
system on which it will be run. Even an administrator who
is familiar with his system and confident in his ability to
accurately make changes still makes errors [9, 16, 21]. Part
of the problem is that administrators have to incorporate
complex constraints communicated to them by users and
higher level managers into the policy. As a result an orga-
nization’s access-control policy may contain many exception
cases which are often added by a variety of administrators [5,
10]. In a recent survey of over 11,000 security professionals
the Ponemon Institute found that access rights to IT re-
sources are often given out in an ad-hoc manner for specific
projects (29% of respondents) or granted based on depart-
mental demands (25% of respondents) [17].
The result is situations where policies actively running in
an organization have errors which cause them to act in an
unintended manner. In his work on firewall policies Wool
showed that of the 37 policies he analyzed every single one
was mis-configured [21]. Oppenheimer et al. conducted an
analysis of web service errors and found that the largest
cause of failure was administrator errors and policy errors
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were the largest category of administrator errors [16].
Security researchers would like to assist administrators in
their analysis of access-control policy. To this end many
tools have been created that analyze the relationships be-
tween rules and provide administrators with helpful infor-
mation such as conflicts, misconfigurations and rule dom-
ination [3, 8, 20]. Unfortunately few if any of these tools
are commonly used by administrators [11] for some of the
reasons that are discussed in Section 2.
In this paper we will discuss some of the motivating ethno-
graphic research that has focused on security administra-
tors. We will look at how administrators use and interact
with their tools to address security, specifically policy con-
cerns (Section 2). Then we will consider the issues involved
with policy analysis and more rigorously define our problem
space (Section 3). Using the usability and policy analysis
constraints we will put forward a proposed interface that
would allow administrators to examine the output from pol-
icy analysis tools in a way that allows them to better under-
stand the output and take the necessary action (Section 4).
Finally we will discuss related work (Section 5) and summa-
rize (Section 6).
2. ADMINISTRATION
Several different ethnographic and contextual studies have
explored the tasks, opinions and cultural structure of secu-
rity professionals. Such studies have identified several im-
portant trends in how security professionals engage in secu-
rity tasks.
2.1 Tool Usage
Administrators use many different tools in their daily ac-
tivities. These tools vary by tasks and administrators often
switch between them as their task changes [5, 7]. We know
of no research specifically addressing the types of tools com-
monly used to modify and maintain policies but there are
several studies examining the types of tools used in general
security administration.
Botta et. al. found that security professionals appreci-
ate tools that exhibit easy to understand correlations be-
tween the data and the tool’s output. Administrators in
their study tended to avoid tools where it was difficult to
understand how the output related to the data [7]. In their
work Barrett et al. described an instance where an adminis-
trator mis-interpreted how a tool worked and spent several
hours attempting to remove a non-existant bug [5].
As a result many administrators write their own scripts
or use basic command line tools such as ps (lists all running
processes). Botta et al. observed one administrator who
had accumulated 2,000 scripts over 25 years [7]. These tools
are less powerful than specially designed tools with beautiful
GUIs but the administrator can be sure that the output he
is getting is correct. He can also feel assured that his mental
model of how the tool is working matches what is actually
happening.
2.2 Cognitive Load
Cognitive overload is another major issue for administra-
tors. The policies they deal with can be extremely large
and virtually impossible to maintain in working memory.
As a result administrators have to use methods and tools to
reduce policies into manageable pieces that can be worked
with.
Altmann discusses the impact of the limitations of work-
ing memory in his work on expert computer programmers.
He found that while it is virtually impossible for an expert
computer programmer working on a large program to keep
all relevant details in working memory the programmer is
able to store the location of potentially needed details in
near-term memory. When the programmer has the need for
such a detail he is able to retrieve the location (approximate
line number) of the needed detail which can then be refer-
enced [4]. We anticipate that a security professional who is
manipulating a large policy file may follow a similar mental
process. As he works with the file he builds an understand-
ing of the location of relevant information. When a specific
detail is needed he is able to retrieve its location (provided
it has been recently seen) and can scroll back to view it in
detail.
Observation of security administrators reveals that they
actively attempt to deal with extra cognitive load by pro-
gressively eliminating irrelevant data. In their work on log
visualization Abdullah et al. observed that administrators
would use tools in order to remove all the irrelevant data
first then try and sort through what remained [1]. Botta et
al. also observed administrators using tools in order to do
filtering of data. An administrator would take the output
from one tool and feed it into another tool which could then
be used to find the important information.
2.3 Motivating Example
Bob is an administrator at the corporate offices for an in-
ternational banking company. The corporate offices contains
many office buildings which house several thousand employ-
ees. Access to offices, meeting rooms and labs within the
buildings is controlled by a swipe card system maintained
by the IT department of which Bob is a member.
Whenever employees need access to a new location they
submit a request to an online form which sends a notification
to Bob or one of his co-admins who then make the necessary
changes to the central policy. Since several different people
are all making changes to the building’s access-control pol-
icy there are cases where one administrator adds a rule not
knowing that another administrator has previously created a
rule concerning the same user, action, resource tuple. When
this happens the system can enter an unintended state. In
the best case some rules may never be used, in the worst case
the system may enter a conflicted state and all members of
a group may be unable to access their resources.
To help address policy issues Bob would like to use a pol-
icy analysis program which could help him identify and fix
potential issues before they become problems.
3. POLICY ANALYSIS
We ground work reported here on Privacy-aware Role
Based Access Control (P-RBAC) because of following rea-
sons:
• P-RBAC is a natural extension of well-known RBAC
models [15, 13] to support fine-grained access control
policies. Customized conditional languages [15, 14]
in P-RBAC can express commonly used conditions in
policies. Policy authors can directly specify flexible
relation, AND/OR, between permission assignments
[14]. These functionalities of P-RBAC make it an ap-
propriate tool for complicated policy deployment en-
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• Policy ratification [2] is directly supported by P-RBAC
[13, 14, 15]. Policy ratification provides a formal pro-
cess to policy managers/authors to certify the appro-
priateness of a policy before the policy is activated.
Three primitive operations are identified for Policy
ratification: conflict detection, dominance and cov-
erage [2]. Policies are in conflict if they cannot be
enforced simultaneously. A policy is dominated or re-
dundant if the policy when added to a system does not
modify the behavior of the system. Coverage refers to
the determination of whether a policy set covers all
the cases of interest, e.g., all users in the system have
rights to at least one resource in the system.
3.1 A Brief Introduction of P-RBAC
P-RBAC [13, 14, 15] is a family of Privacy-aware Role
Based Access Control (RBAC) models that extend RBAC
with support for privacy policies. P-RBAC supports the no-
tion of “privacy-aware” permissions, that is, authorizations
taking into account privacy-relevant information, such as the
purpose of data usage, as well as “regular permissions”, that
is, which role can perform which action on which resource
under what conditions. P-RBAC, illustrated in Figure 1,
includes several sets of entities: Users, Roles, Resources,
Actions, Purposes, Obligations, and Conditions expressed
by using customized conditional languages [15, 14].
Permissions
Action Pair
Purposes
ResourcesRolesUsers
Actions
Conditions
Obligations
UA PA
Purpose Binding
Figure 1: Components in P-RBAC
A user in P-RBAC is human being, and a role represents
a job function or job title within the organization with some
associated semantics regarding the authority and responsi-
bility conferred on a member of the role. Resources refer
to any objects or information that should be protected. An
action is an executable image of a program, which upon in-
vocation executes some function for the user. The types
of action and resources that P-RBAC controls depend on
the type of system in which they are implemented. Con-
ditions further limits the scope of the permission to realize
fine-grained access control. The motivations for introducing
purposes and obligations in P-RBAC are discussed in [13,
15]. A permission consists of an action, a resource, a condi-
tion, a purpose, and an obligation set. Access control poli-
cies are specified by user assignments (assigning users to
roles) and permission assignments (assigning permissions to
roles). In this paper, we leave the analysis related to obli-
gations [13] and purposes as future work and only focus on
permission assignments due to space reasons. It should be
noted that we may use the terms permission assignments
and rules interchangeably depending on the context.
3.2 Relation of Permission Assignments
In our example Bob, the administrator, manages access
control policies for a large system in conjunction with sev-
eral other administrators and departmental policy authors.
Now we investigate how these administrators author policies
together with departmental authors in terms of P-RBAC as-
signments.
Bob and his co-workers are part of the central IT depart-
ment for their company but there are many other IT de-
partments spread all over the world which are responsible
for maintaining the policies that relate to their own depart-
ments. Since Bob’s department is the primary IT depart-
ment headed by its Chief Security Officer, they write some
special permission assignments which are enforced across all
offices. Usually these special permission assignment are high
level directives that are not sufficiently fine-grained and can-
not be directly enforced. Meanwhile, Bob, his co-workers,
and department authors also write some permission assign-
ments for departments, in other words, these permission as-
signments are only enforced within some departments.
Two different permission assignments are identified in this
scenario. One is “if” permission assignment, also known as
terminate permission assignment, that will allow an access
request by itself within a department. Another one is “only
if” permission assignment, also know as mandatory permis-
sion assignment, that will be required by all access requests
related to the permission assignment [6, 18]. P-RBAC di-
rectly supports both mandatory and terminate permission
assignments by allowing policy administrators to specify re-
lations like“AND”and“OR”among permission assignments.
pm1∧pm2∧ ...∧pmn∧ ((ptd11 ∗ptd12...)∨ (ptd21 ∗ptd22...)∨ ...)
where ∧ represents “AND”, ∨ represents “OR”, and ∗ repre-
sents either “AND” or “OR”, pmi represents mandatory per-
mission assignments, and ptdij represents the j-th terminal
permission assignments in the i-th department. The expres-
sion specifies that in order to allow an access request all
mandatory permission assignments must allow the request
and at least one terminate permission assignment allow the
request as well.
3.3 Conflicts and Dominance
Conditions in permission assignments and the complexity
of the relations between permissions assignments can easily
cause administrators to think they had just made a good
change when in truth their new policy conflicts with some
existing one or is simply subsumed by another policy.
Since all policies have to be enforced simultaneously, and
at same time conditions are required for fine-grained access
control, it is possible that conflicting permission assignments
arise due to unsatisfiable conditions. For instance, given two
permission assignments:
PA1 = Employee, Access, Conference Room 1101, 9am <
Time < 12pm
PA2 = Employee, Access, Conference Room 1101, 1pm <
Time < 5pm
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Figure 2: Base interface for Prisimos . On the left is
the policy shown in a grid interface. On the right is
the output of a policy analysis algorithm. Clicking
on any of the recommendations causes the interface
to shift to the one pictured in Figure 3.
If both PA1 and PA2 are mandatory permission assign-
ments, then no one can really access the conference room be-
cause it is impossible to access the room at a time of day that
is both between 9am-12pm and at the same time between
1pm-5pm. If one of the permission assignments is manda-
tory and the other one is a terminal permission assignment,
then the terminal permission assignment is useless.
Similarly, it is possible that one permission assignment
dominates another permission assignment. For instance,
given two permission assignments:
PA3 = Employee, Access, Conference Room 1101, 9am <
Time < 5pm
PA4 = Employee, Access, Conference Room 1101, 1pm <
Time < 5pm
If PA3 and PA4 are mandatory permission assignments,
PA4 dominates PA3 because the existence of PA3 has no
effect on the final decision based on these policies. By con-
trast, if PA3 and PA4 are terminal permission assignments
with OR relation, PA3 dominates PA4 for the same reason.
Theoretically the detection of conflicts and dominance re-
lation in policies is a satisfiability problem of conditions that
can be NP-hard in its worst cases. However, it has been
shown that for conditions most commonly used in policies,
such as range on numbers, string comparison, and relation
on a finite partial order set, tractable algorithms exist [2].
These algorithms are applied in this paper to detect possible
conflicts and dominance relations in permission assignments.
4. Prisimos
The Prisimos system is a proposed (not yet implemented)
design based on the authors’ prior experience with system
administration and policy analysis. Prisimos is intended to
help administrators visualize and address issues with con-
flicts and dominance by communicating the output of pol-
icy analysis algorithms in a meaningful and actionable way.
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Figure 3: The Prisimos interface after the user has
selected to view conflicting rules 1 and 21. The in-
terface limits the display to only include relevant
policy elements.
Prisimos is designed to present both the output of a policy
analysis algorithm and the policy itself to the user in a way
which visualizes the results of the analysis in terms of the
individual rules in the policy.
The primary interface for Prisimos is shown in Figures
2 and 3. The interface is divided into two primary com-
ponents. On the left is a grid interface which displays the
policy as a list of rules. On the right is a sidebar which
shows the output of a policy analysis algorithm. Used to-
gether the two components allow the user to step through
the algorithm output and for each potential issue examine
the relevant parts of the policy itself before deciding upon
the appropriate action.
The grid interface on the left side of the interface displays
the policy itself, the design was inspired by the Expandable
Grid presented by Reeder et al. [19]. Across the top of the
grid is a list of all the currently displayed rules which in this
case represent permission assignments. On the left are all
the entities of the rules. Each rule in the policy is broken into
its component entities, in this case roles, resources, actions
and conditions. These component entities are displayed on
the left as top level nodes for their sections. Below each
entity name are all the potential values that entity could
have. For example, in Figure 3 under the conditions entity
we see the group Time of day and below that the list of dif-
ferent time ranges. In this figure the number of values shown
for each entity of potential day times has been reduced to
only show those values relevant to conflicting rules 1 and 21.
Clicking the “See All” link would open up the entity so all
values would be shown.
In the interior of the grid are a series of green boxes. The
presence of a green check box means that the specified rule
uses that value. In Figure 3 we can see that Rule 1 con-
cerns Staff, Perimeter, access and 9am to noon. In natural
language this might read Staff are permitted to access any
perimeter door between 9am and noon. A green box next to
a group is used to indicate that a member of that group is
mentioned in the current rule. This allows an administrator
to easily scan for relevant groups without having to search
through them. In Figure 2 we can use the green boxes to
see that Time of Day is used in Rules 1 but Room Reserved
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is not used as a condition.
The sidebar on the right displays the output of the algo-
rithm analysis. As was mentioned in Section 3 the Prisimos
visualization is designed to accommodate a wide range of
different types of algorithms. In our example the algorithm
looks for Conflicting and Dominating rules which are dis-
played in their own sections in the Recommended Changes
bar. A different type of analysis algorithm might look for
potential administrator error or more domain specific con-
cerns. For each type of issue we list the sets of rules which
are having that issue. In Figure 2 we can see that rules 1
and 21 are in conflict. We can also see that rules 6, 9 and
12 are in conflict.
The user can click on any of the identified conflicting sets
of rules (Figure 2) which will cause the grid interface to
the left to only display those rules (Figure 3). Additionally
the interface will automatically hide all values which are not
used by the currently displayed rules and highlight the values
that are in conflict. This reduces the cognitive load the
administrator has to deal with by eliminating unnecessary
information and highlighting important information.
We believe that a visualization like Prisimos will assist
administrators in viewing the output from policy analysis
tools for several reasons. First the tool assists the user by
minimizing the parts of the policy that need to be viewed
at one time. This reduces the amount of working memory
the administrator needs to view the policy. It also allows
the user to ignore all unimportant parts of the policy and
look only at the relevant rules in an uncluttered environment
instead of scrolling around trying to find and mentally parse
the rules.
Secondly, it is easy to see the relationship between what
is shown in the policy section of Prisimos and the actual
policy. The tool engages in minimal alterations of the rules
themselves and instead attempts to display the rules in a
format that is as close to the actual rules as possible. This
format makes it easier for an administrator to form an ac-
curate mental model of the policy itself. Additionally if an
administrator wants to double check a specific rule with the
original file it should be easy for them to compare the visu-
alization of the rule with the text version.
5. RELATEDWORK
There have been several systems proposed which assist
policy authors in managing their policies through automatic
analysis of the policy rules.
Alshaer et al. presented a Policy Advisor for firewall poli-
cies which analyzes a set of firewall rules and provides the
user with the output in the form of a series of recommen-
dations. Their approach also shows the list of rules in an
easily comparable table format [3]. However, unlike our pro-
posed solution their interface makes no attempt to limit the
number of rules a user is viewing. Additionally the Policy
Advisor is designed to specifically work with firewall rules
and is not well suited for access-control policies in general.
There are several interfaces that have been developed that
assist the user in modifying and creating system actionable
security policy. A system actionable policy is a policy which
is created and edited by a human but enforced and acted
upon by a computer system. One example is the SPARCLE
Policy Workbench which allows policy authors to write pol-
icy in natural language and parses the policy so it can be
enforced by a computer [8, 20]. The Expandable Grid is
another example of a tool which allows users to manipulate
the system actionable policy for File System rules [19]. Both
of these tools are designed for creating and viewing policies
but they address the issue of viewing the output of analysis
tools in a simple and understandable way.
6. SUMMARY
We looked at how security administrators regard and use
their tools to manage large systems. We also looked at how
managing such systems is challenging for administrators due
to the system’s size and complexity. Analysis tools that
analyze large rule sets for issues exist but are difficult to use
and don’t conform to how administrators typically use tools.
We then looked at policy analysis in terms of P-RBAC.
We examined some of the potential issues an administrator
might face in a system using P-RBAC and how the policy
can have conflicts and domination issues.
Finally we proposed a system called Prisimos which pro-
vides a visualization for both the policy and the analysis.
Using information hiding techniques Prisimos allows users
to step through each issue identified in the analysis viewing
only details relevant for that specific issue.
In future work we hope to build the Prisimos system and
connect it with existing policy analysis tools. We would
like to explore how the visualization would work in different
policy domains. We would also like to test the effectiveness
of the interface in laboratory studies with real users followed
up by studies on administrators in real settings.
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